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THE MOTIVES OF TRADE CREDIT USAGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
RISK PERCEPTION FOR DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOR
Kun Zhao, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2012
The objective of this study is to discuss two motives of trade credit usage for large and
small firms. To examine one of the motives–-transaction motive—the study models a
circulation mechanism in trade credit. The nature of the mechanism is such that firms are
motivated to balance their trade credit inflows (accounts payable) with their outflows
(accounts receivable). An empirical test is therefore needed to examine this issue. The
findings in Chapter 1 support the theory of transaction motive that firms with more bank
tolerance are more likely to advance the flow of trade credit to their clients. In particular,
a one-unit increase in trade credit acceptance would raise the credit lending by
approximately 0.44 units. Meanwhile, the financially healthy firms with positive net cash
flow are better able to lend trade credit to their clients. As one of the contributing factors,
bank lending is positively and significantly related to trade credit lending.

To refine and extend the literature on trade credit allocation, the study moves to a focus on
financing motive of trade credit in a presence of transaction motive. The two forces
(transaction and financing) either aid or resist the flow’s movement from suppliers to
clients, and the resistance to the movement is thereby seen as a diversion for self-financing.
This study generates two models measuring in-stream credit flows and diversion, in
response to the two different motives. From the estimation of seemingly unrelated
regression equations (SURE), the findings in Chapter 2 show that (1) borrowing constraint
as the major driving force results in a diversion toward self-financing in small firms, and (2)
large firms are less financing-constrained, and as a result advance more trade credit flows

from suppliers to clients.

Meanwhile, a study on risk perception was conducted. Investors who perceive risk
awareness get ready to cope with uncertainty and changes in their financial account. Risk
perception, as an extension of the Expected Utility (EU) framework, will lead to a better
understanding of participation in risky financial activity. An evaluation of risk perception is
carried out in the following aspects: (1) health risk (2) inflation pressure (3) economic
depression. A binary logistic model is employed to measure the effect of these risk
perception factors on the odds ratios of risky asset investment. This study on people
nearing retirement shows that a person’s capacity to perceive risk from surroundings,
either in a statistical sense or in an economic context, is closely related to the risky asset
share in pension plans.
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CHAPTER 1
TRANSFER OF TRADE CREDIT—INVESTIGATION
ON HONG KONG DATA
Introduction
Trade credit facilitates firms to buy without carrying cash. Firms buy raw materials and
goods from their suppliers in exchange for repayment within a certain period. Payment
beyond this period will be charged interest. The same also happens on the opposite side.
Firms sell products to clients without demanding immediate payment, instead, firms
specify a repayment obligation, a practice that makes firms appear like banks that shift
bank credit from depositors to debtors. To further explore the role of trade credit, we
perform the study that firms transfer a substantial proportion of trade credit from
suppliers to clients. To my knowledge, this paper serves as an initial attempt to test that a
firm’s willingness to lend credit depends on the availability of credit acceptance from
either its suppliers or banks.

Trend of Payables and Receivables in Hong Kong from 2001 to 2008
A lack of statistics leaves readers in doubt about the importance of trade credit for sales.
Figure 1 might serve to dispel the doubt. In this study of 146 Hong Kong large firms,
accounts receivable account for a high portion of total sales with a peak of 17 percent in
2007, and then the ratio of receivables to total sales falls in 2008. 1 The ratio of payables
to total sales varies less widely than that of receivables, and falls into the range of 13 to
15 percent of total sales from the years 2002 to 2008. As seen in Figure 2, the aggregated
volume of accounts receivable was much closer to payable prior to 2005, and sequentially
deviated in the following years. From 2005 to 2007, receivables grew faster than payables,
The fall in the receivables may be understood as a consequence of financial crisis. Firms suffer the
bank credit rations during this crisis, and thereby provide less trade credit to their clients.
1

1

but eventually converged at 2008. This trend indicates a sign of convergence between
payables and receivables. Meanwhile, the balance sheet of firms indicates that more than
90 percent of these firms (92 percent of firms in our sample accept trade credit from
their suppliers while 98 percent of firms extend trade credit to their customers) used
trade credit from 2001 to 2008. These findings encourage us to further explore the
relationship between the accounts receivable and payable.
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Notice: The figure presents the aggregate receivable and payable to sales ratio for the selected firms
in each year from 2001 to 2008

Figure 1.1 The ratio of trade credit to sales for selected large firms of Hong Kong firms
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Figure 1.2 Aggregate volume ($1 million) of accounts receivable and payable for selected
high wealth firms of Hong Kong
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This paper provides an empirical investigation on transfer of trade credit in large Hong
Kong firms from 2001 to 2008. Less attention was paid to unveil the determinants of
creating trade credit for these large wealth firms, as previous literature often focused on
small wealth firms. It is worth noting that small firms are unlikely to keep a substantial mass
in both accounts receivable and payable, whereas large firms are engaged more often in the
two aspects. This assumption is supported by the fact that the aggregate of accounts
receivable and payable in large firms was roughly equal, even if a slight divergence
appeared in years of 2006 and 2007(as shown in Figure 2). The line of payables matches
with that of receivables—a fact that reflects the existence of a circulation mechanism in
large firms who are willing to smooth the flows. The hypothesis in this paper therefore is
confined to large firms where payables and receivables effectively facilitate firms to make
deals with suppliers and clients.

The Importance of Trade Credit for Large Firms
Trade credit inflows (accounts payable) occur even at the first stage of a firm’s
production. However, the outflows (accounts receivable) cannot be released until
production is completed. At this point, the supplier plays a role of depositor while the
client serves as the debtor. It is important to note the causality between credit inflows
and outflows to address a possible endogenous problem in the model. One further issue
is raised with regard to the motive of large firms that offer credit to their clients,
considering the large firms have already accepted credit from their suppliers. At least two
reasons for this issue can be readily seen. (1) Large firms are unlikely to be credit rationed.
It implies that large firms with more bank tolerance are able to raise money without
difficulty. Free from the worries of financing, large firms are more willing to obey the
rules of trade credit to facilitate firms to trade with clients. In fact, long-term bank debts
have an obvious advantage over any other short-term source of debts (including trade
credit) in terms of reliability and consistency. (2) To stimulate sales, large firms agree to
sell goods without demanding payment in money, to their clients.
3

This paper hypothesizes that firms are willing and able to obey the rules of trade credit,
as they have accepted a considerable amount of trade credit from their suppliers. The
primary finding of the paper is that large firms apply a set of criteria to allocate the
distribution of trade credit. Moreover, a profitable firm makes the credit circulation
channel smoother. It is gauged that a one-unit increase in trade credit acceptance is
associated with a 0.44 units increase in trade credit lending. It has been suggested in
previous studies that bank loans are used to assist and encourage trade credit lending.
The relationship is examined and accepted in this study. It is shown that bank lending is
significant and positively associated with trade credit lending.

Related Literature
By reviewing the literature, it has been known that the large firm is the primary force
driving the advance of trade credit flow from suppliers to clients. Few studies have looked
at the nature of the mechanism that large firms are motivated to balance their trade credit
inflows (accounts payable) and outflows (accounts receivable).

Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) illustrates that the motives for different-sized firms on
trade credit usage vary differently. To summarize, two motives are suggested: financing
and transaction motives. Between the two motives, financing motive is most often seen
in small and medium size firms. Those firms without sufficient funds borrow vendor
credit to sustain operations, and thereby offer less trade credit to their clients. Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) state that small firms may be expected to provide trade credit to their
buyers, but due to financing limitations, they failed to do so. The statistics gathered by
Petersen and Rajan (1997) suggest that small firms have a relatively lower ratio of
payables and receivables to sales than large firms do. In the study of Petersen and Rajan
(1997), only one third of firms in their sample of different-sized firms use credit as a net

4

source of financing.2 In this context, for these high wealth firms with less financing
constraints, the purpose of using trade credit is more likely to save transaction costs.
Ferris (1981) addresses the issue that trade credit provides information on the amount of
cash firms need to repay for each transaction. From this perspective, large firms save
transaction costs on cash management.
The existing literature ignores the fact that trade credit given by their suppliers has a
significant impact on the firms’ decision on credit availability for their customers. The
major concern of this paper is the extent to which the trade credit acceptance generates the
credit lending.

Bank Loans and Trade Credit Lending
Large firms are willing and able to obey the rule of trade credit that is devised to facilitate
firms to buy or sell goods from suppliers or clients. Banks ration firms if they monitor a
slide in the firms’ sales, inventory, or liquid assets. Bank tolerance varies in a wide range,
across different sized firms. Large-wealth firms are less likely to be rationed by banks as
long as they keep a healthy performance (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1993). Most financially
healthy firms want to keep a steady balance between credit acceptance and lending,
regardless of the difficulties in practice3. The previous literature (Petersen and Rajan ,1997;
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) states that only low and medium wealth firms use trade credit
for financing, but high wealth firms do not. Banks always ration small and medium firms
during a period of tight monetary policy. Suffering major losses of capital and even facing
the risk of shutting down, small firms count on vendor financing as an external short-term
source of financing, even though they will be charged a higher interest rate4 by their
Petersen and Rajan(1997) point out that the transaction motive is prevalent in large-wealth firms.
However, they do not verify their hypothesis on large-wealth firms due to the limitation of their dataset.
3 The figures in the financial statements display the firms’ financial position or condition by a point of
time that is often fixed in the end of each period. To the extent, the financial statements could not
literally reflect the firms’ financial health if their customers repay one day late after the data of financial
statements. Another reason leads to the unbalance between receivables and payables is that if the firms
involved in a slide in their sales, they might increase account receivables to boost sales.
4 Normally, firms accept the offer by their supplier with free interest within certain days, or even with
2
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suppliers. In contrast, large firms with sufficient and slack bank loans will be more likely to
sustain in business.

Firms’ Financial Status and Trade Credit Lending
Income and cash-flow statements serve as good indicators of firms’ financial status.
Before making an investment decision, investors should gather income and cash-flow
statements at hand. These financial reports contributed to a better understanding of firms’
market capability and orientations. These reports, from different perspectives, provide
information on firms’ financial health. It often happened that opposite results will be
drawn after evaluating income and cash-flow statements separately. For instance, a firm
reports low earnings shown on an income statement as the firm sold off its products at a
price much lower than the market would pay for it. Meanwhile, a substantial cash inflow
appears in the cash flow statement as the assets are sold off.

Firms hold large cash balances for a variety of reasons, such as slack trade, investment
opportunity, or strategies. Cash balances may serve as an important indicator that measures
liquidity and investment opportunities (Alti, 2003; Almeide, Campello, and Weisbach,
2004 ) adopt the cash flow sensitivity to capture the financial constraints with which the
firm has to struggle. They find that firms with a positive cash flow desire to expand. The
negative cash flow makes firms defensive. Specifically, a positive cash flow suggests
profitability and demand to expand, whereas the opposite is a sign of weakness or
overgrown expansion. It is therefore proposed that those profitable firms might offer
more credit for their clients in an attempt to expand their size.

a slight discount before the due day. An interest rate will be charged if the firms default the repayment
by the due day. The interest rate is higher than the bank’s rate. Few firms default the repayment unless
they are suffering a severe financing problem.

6

Model and Data
Model
In order to test the aforementioned hypothesis, Meltzer’s model (1960) was adopted.
Meltzer examined the determinants of net receivables and the responses to monetary
policy. Some changes are needed due to the different hypotheses of this paper from
Meltzer’s. Since the main concern of the paper surrounds the impact of trade credit
inflows on the outflows, net receivables should be disaggregated into individual
components: receivables and payables.
The model is formulized as:
Re cit    it  b1 Payit  b2 Liqit  b3 Incit  b4 Debtit  b 5 Invit  b6Cashit   it --(3.1)

where i, and t index firm and time period;  is an intercept term;  controls for
firm-specific and time-invariant effect controlling for heterogeneity;  is an i.i.d error term.
Rec is accounts receivable, Pay represents accounts payable, Liq measures the risk of
liquidation by subtracting cash and short term investment from the current liability.
Different from Meltzer (1960), we use the difference between cash and current liability,
instead of the ratio. This action is intended for use on a scale of one million dollars that is
consistent with the scale of right-hand side variables. Inc is a net income involved in
profit-generating activities. Debt is a long term debt, and the mature period of long term
debt normally varies between 3 and 8 years. Bank loan is characterized as a long-term debt,
whereas trade credit is required to be paid off with a short period lag of manufacturing or
selling. Inv is a lag of inventory. This operation is made due to some degree of correlation
between inventory and accounts payable since the inventory grows alongside the accounts
payable during one accounting period in the balance sheet.5 Last, net cash from cash flow
statement are entered in our analysis. The definition for net cash is more general than the

As the raw materials and goods are provided by the supplier, the firm owns accounts payable under
the liability item. In order to balance the balance sheet, the adjustments are needed under the assets item.
The adjustments depend on the real economic activity. For example, if firms finish the production and
sold within one accounting period, then the adjustments should be made on cash. This happens only
when the firms used up all materials and goods from the suppliers. Otherwise, inventory accounts for
most changes on account payable in balance sheet.
5

7

one in the balance sheet. The “cash”-shown on the balance sheet only represents cash
availability. However, on the cash flow statement, the “cash” refers to a variety of activities
to collect money, and is a more precise measure to reflect the financial health in terms of
liquidity6 relative to cash.
Data
Table 1 gives the mean, and other descriptive statistics about the data of large Hong Kong
firms. They are taken from Worldscope and One Source database. Hong Kong, as a great
financial and trade center of Asia, thrives on its advanced financial industry, as well as an
exported-oriented economy. The features of Hong Kong economy meet the needs of this
paper, highlighting both transaction and financing motives. The sample period ranges
from 2001 to 2008, and it is worth noting that this period contains the recent financial
crisis.

I generated dummy variables to monitor the firms’ financial condition. I scored one to the
dummy if the net cash flow was greater than zero; otherwise, I scored zero. It is intended to
compare financially healthy firms with less healthy firms in terms of credit lending
behavior, and thereby introduce an interaction term. This term is given by multiplying the
dummy and payables. The expected result by adding this interaction term is that healthier
firms will be more likely to extend credit than weaker firms will. With the exception of
dummy, all of variables above are measured in one million USD.

A question might be presented regarding the distinction between large firms and small
firms. No unique criterion was innovated to identify the firms’ size. It is inappropriate to
apply some unique criterion into the overall industries or the countries that are less or more
developed. An appropriate approach to deal with the issue is to seek a critical point in the

6

See Matolcsy,Z.,Booth,P. and Wider, B., 2005.
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Table 1.1
Summary Statistics for Large Hong Kong Firms Measured in One Million U.S. Dollars
2002
Variable

9

Accounts
Rec.
Accounts
Payable
Liquidation
Net_Income
Long term
debt
Inventory_lag
Cash
flow_lag
Total assets
Accounts
Rec.
Accounts
Payable
Liquidation

2003

2004

Max.

Min.

Mean

Std Dev

N

Miss

Max.

Min.

Mean

Std
Dev

807.40

0.00

65.32

118.62

132

5

890.80

0.00

72.65

123.72

133

4

2444.70

0.00

94.67

240.10

134

1104.10

0.00

76.59

177.05

122

15

1542.80

0.00

89.58

199.91

121

16

2169.10

0.00

101.17

257.51

124

3687.80
1841.40

-296.40
-100.10

139.76
49.63

453.59
197.85

136
137

1
0

1651.00
1499.50

-4041.00
-603.60

76.94
48.69

463.17
179.58

136
137

1
0

2246.70
2416.10

-575.80
-125.50

115.41
108.89

320.42
312.82

136
137

18153.60

0.00

360.35

1655.29

136

1

29648.90

0.00

453.48

2595.30

136

1

33434.30

0.00

467.51

2900.77

136

3241.20

0.00

85.72

323.39

129

8

3224.10

0.00

83.31

317.32

132

5

2589.60

0.00

87.04

295.65

129

6074.00

-7.90

176.26

714.95

137

0

5502.90

0.00

173.05

637.53

137

0

14371.50

-1.90

248.41

1294.34

137

63878.40

7.50

1939.31
2005

6463.42

136

1

80057.60

0.20

2082.23
2006

7626.56

136

1

83265.00

29.90

2243.94
2007

7968.97

136

1911.10

0.00

103.73

222.64

135

2

2594.50

0.00

153.86

352.15

134

3

3712.90

0.00

191.65

466.29

136

2210.70

0.00

105.32

279.20

128

9

2850.00

0.00

132.24

385.64

130

7

3489.10

0.00

154.39

477.80

130

4437.70

-571.10

158.45

547.70

136

1

3347.60

-795.10

185.24

509.64

136

1

4015.80

-1050.20

214.82

600.27

136

N

Miss

Max.

Min.

Mean

Std Dev

N

Table 1.1—Continued

Net_Income

2411.70

-77.00

157.34

391.81

Long term
debt

30809.50

0.00

476.22

2687.57

Inventory_lag

2561.00

0.00

105.04

332.32

Cash
flow_lag

9488.60

-4.50

240.08

953.43

Total assets

77005.20

32.00

2478.47

7814.25

13
7
13
6
12
7
13
7
13
6

0

2904.80

-321.50

173.15

452.99

137

0

3922.20

-449.50

237.77

597.41

137

1

35102.40

0.00

554.20

3054.41

136

1

34959.60

0.00

626.96

3075.28

136

10

4760.70

0.00

144.19

519.70

127

10

5769.90

0.00

172.21

619.29

130

0

6730.30

0.40

250.93

836.52

137

0

9832.20

0.20

320.47

1141.16

137

1

87115.10

35.00

2901.40

8939.87

136

1

102499.00

32.00

3612.04

10773.04

136

2008

10

Accounts
Rec.
Accounts
Payable

3489.50

0.00

172.41

426.38

3493.00

0.00

176.19

508.25

Liquidation

6520.00

-1295.50

265.32

779.14

Net_Income

3541.30

-103.90

138.45

390.45

Long term
debt

31933.20

0.00

679.62

2875.16

Inventory_lag

6241.60

0.00

206.26

681.41

Cash
flow_lag

14294.70

-3.50

434.72

1698.39

Total assets

86214.70

2.60

3819.18

10169.52

13
5
13
2
13
6
13
7
13
6
13
0
13
7
13
6

2
5
1
0
1
7
0
1

sample data.7 In this paper, we place firms with greater than 2.5 million dollars in 2008 into
the large-sized firm class, which are similar cutoffs used in previous studies (Carpenter,
Fazzari, and Petersen, 1994; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Attached
in Appendix A are robustness checks, which are measured by two optional
standards—profitability and employment size. The primary findings of this paper are
robust to the different choices of large-firm size.
Estimation Results
The correlation matrix of independent variables is examined as an initial process of
estimation. A test for collinearity is arranged. The Pearson correlations shown in Table 2
suggest the presence of multicollinearity. A high degree of multi-collinearity (greater than
0.7) may overestimate standard errors and degrade reliability of estimates. The interaction
term involving payables shows a high correlation with payables. As a consequence of
high correlation between variable (payables) and its own interaction (payables*dummy), it
does not weaken the results. Conversely, a high correlation between predictors (lag of
cash and long term debt) appears and, as a result, may provide redundant information
about the response. Except lag of cash and long-term debt, the others are safely
ensconced in a grey area. An easy way to solute this problem is to eliminate correlated
predictors from the model. The reason for running a set of regressions is twofold: (1) To
avoid collinearity of independent variables. To treat the co-linearity problem, they will be
distributed apart into different regressions (2). To control the effect of dummy variable.

The criterion for the definition of large firm varies in previous studies. It depends on the
specifications you are interested in. For example, Blaso (2005) defines low wealth firms below the 55th
percentile of profit in his sample data. Conversely, Gertler and Gilchrist design the 30th percentile of
sales as the cutoff for small and large firms. Moreover, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) discuss
firms’ debt maturity by dividing the firms into quartiles by value of total assets. In this paper, we apply
total assets to identify large firms.
7
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Table 1.2
The Pearson Correlations among Variables of Interest
Accounts_Pay

Net_Inco

Total_Long_Term_

Inventory_

Cash_L

AP*Dum

able

me

Debt

Lag

ag

my

Accounts_Payable

1

Net_Income

0.464

1

0.619

0.596

1

Inventory_Lag

0.396

0.618

0.464

1

Cash_Lag

0.162

0.104

0.219

0.069

Total_Long_Term_
Debt

1

AP*Dummy
0.574
0.311
0.346
0.244
-0.142 1
Dummy: Net Cash Flow—1: positive net cash flow; 0: zero or negative net cash flow
According to the Pearson correlation definition, a correlation less than 0.4 would be slight, or small. A
correlation less than 0.7 would be moderate, and the remaining is then a problem of high correlation, or
very dependable relationship.

As seen in Table 3 from fixed effect linear regression,8 all estimates are statistically
significant and positive. By examining the first column of Table 3, it is apparent that credit
acceptance is highly correlated with lending, indicating that a one-unit increase in payables
is associated with a 0.45 units increase in receivables. Long term debt loans have relatively
smaller coefficients and lead to a 0.05 units increase in accounts receivable. It indicates that
long-term debts including bank loans and other financial institutions could be
complementary to trade credit lending. But the effect of a bank loan is not considered to
be a major factor associated with trade credit outflows. It indicates that large firms are
less likely, though it is significant, to borrow bank loans to create trade credit lending for
their clients. Large firms intend to balance the trade credit acceptance and lending, and
thus make a substantial proportion of trade credit available to their clients. This is
justified by the fact that the marginal effect of payables is estimated to be 0.45, and
actually is nine times the effect of bank loan. It reflects the firms’ propensity to engage in
lending trade credit. As was proposed in the earlier analysis, trade credit allows firms to
sustain their operations with a low transaction balances until their credit lending is paid
The Hausman test has been typically used to determine the fixed or random effect for each regression.
It has been verified that the fixed model is the better model for each of regression.
8
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off. . On the other hand, firms have to lend more trade credit to sell products as risk of
liquidation increases. As a result, less cash availability and more current liability push
firms to increase their sales. A one-unit increase in Liq--a spread of cash and liability,
leads to 0.06 units of receivables to clients.

Table 1.3
Regression Result on Equation 3.1
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Accounts_Payable

0.446***

0.485***

0.439***

0.548***

(0.025)

(0.024)

(0.030)

(0.026)

0.056***

0.043***

0.047***

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

0.097***

0.112***

0.109***

0.082***

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.020)

Liquidation
Net_Income
Long_Term_Debt
Inventory_Lag

0.051***

0.062***

(0.006)

(0.008)

0.148***

0.201***

0.197***

0.169***

(0.021)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.022)

0.065***

0.072***

(0.008)

(0.009)

Cash_Lag
AP*Dummy
Constant

0.054***

0.050***

(0.021)

(0.020)

-3.647

-4.704

-4.928

-8.732

(4.546)

(4.673)

(4.658)

(5.514)

Observations

939

939

939

939

Number of id

132

132

132

132

R-squared

0.689

0.684

0.687

0.645

Dummy: Net Cash Flow—1: positive net cash flow; 0: zero or negative net cash flow
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The inventory lag is presented in the first column of Table 3. It can be interpreted such
that accounts receivable increases by 15 percent units as a one-unit increase in stock of
inventory in the last period. The magnitude of the impact of inventory is found to be the
second largest among those independent variables. An overall estimate does not precisely
13

capture, and even underestimates, the impact of inventory on trade credit transfer. In fact,
the inventory consists of three components: raw materials, intermediates, and finished
goods. The raw materials and intermediates cannot enter the market until production is
eventually completed. Hence, only the finished goods are assumed to play a role in the
process of spread of trade credit. Regardless, the marginal effect of inventory is quite large
in the case of mixing all kinds of goods. For the limited data available, this study is unable
to analyze the significance of different kinds of inventory in terms of composition.
In the second column, the lag of net cash enters the analysis. It is straightforward to see
that net cash is a good indicator for financial constraints, as it is positively related to trade
credit lending. Trade credit lending grows up 6.5 percent units in response to one-unit
increase in the lag of net cash. The other explanatory variables, including accounts payable,
are still statistically significant. The marginal effect of accounts payable is raised slightly, as
well as the lag of inventory.
An interaction between cash flow and accounts payable is incorporated into the model. We
will see whether such an interaction is involved in the trade credit transfer. As shown in the
third column, financially healthy firms are better able to lend trade credit to their clients.
Specifically, firms with less financial constraints offer 0.49 units of receivables to clients as
one unit of accounts payable flows in, whereas the firms with more constraints offer only
0.44.
Conclusions
This paper serves as an initial attempt to assess a circulation mechanism in trade credit. The
trade credit circulates from up-stream suppliers to down-stream firms. The circulation
mechanism is critical to guarantee the continuous trade credit acceptance and lending
among firms. To construct an empirical test on this issue, we collect the information from
the balance sheet, income sheet, and cash flow statement to facilitate our analysis. The
variables of interest extracted from these financial statements are assumed to enable
14

accounts for the trade credit allocation. As a result, trade credit acceptance is identified as
the most influential factor in explaining credit lending. In particular, a one-unit increase in
accounts payable would raise the receivables by approximately 44 percent units. This
result coincides with our assumption that large firms embody the circulation mechanism
between the trade credit inflows and outflows. Previous literature emphasizes the
external factors affecting the trade credit lending, but less attention is paid on the internal
factors.
There has been some debate as to the relationship between bank lending and trade credit
lending. To test the hypothesis, we find the bank lending has little, though significant,
effect on trade credit lending, and even these large firms are not credit rationed by banks.
For the sake of safety, they are willing to follow the route of trade credit, instead of
creating a new source for trade credit lending. Meanwhile, the circulation mechanism
works better for those financially healthy firms.
Another finding of this paper is that the magnitude of the impact of inventory is the
second largest among those independent variables as it relates to the receivables. To avoid
the risk of liquidation, firms with a large stock are aggressively seeking clients as they
become available. They provide trade credit to attract clients in exchange for the repayment
obligation within a short term period.
To summarize, the firms’ lending behavior on trade credit primarily consists of two
methods: (1) They transfer a great amount of trade credit from their suppliers to customers.
(2) Firms with relatively large amount of inventory sell goods, without demanding money,
to clients.
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CHAPTER 2
THE FINANCING AND TRANSACTION MOTIVES OF TRADE CREDIT
ALLOCATION: A COMPARISON OF LARGE
AND SMALL HONG KONG FIRMS
Introduction
Trade credit has been a large source of financing and is widely used in business
transactions. For example, Wal-Mart has used trade credit as a second largest source of
capital after profit, and a larger source of capital than bank borrowing. Trade credit for
Wal-Mart is eight times as much as the amount of commercial paper—capital acceptance
invested by shareholders (Chludek, 2010). However, trade credit received less attention
than it should in literature. The neglect might due to two reasons: (1) the value of trade
credit is reflected in specific goods, whereas bank loans do not confine its activities in
goods or capital market. (2) Trade credit should be paid off with a short period lag of
manufacturing or selling.
A firm buying inputs on credit may return products to its supplier if the firm detects
defects before the payment is due. Meanwhile, the firm also offers trade credit to its client
by specifying a repayment obligation. Trade credit consists of two components: accounts
payable, shown on balance sheet as liability, is the money owned by a firm to its suppliers;
accounts receivable as an asset, is the money given to its clients.
In this paper, two motives of trade credit usage are discussed by examining the two aspects
of trade credit—payables and receivables. Firstly, trade credit stimulates firms’ sales by
signaling product quality to clients. Meanwhile firms adjust their cash balance given by the
information from payables, and get ready to repay the debts to suppliers. Firms, therefore,
save transaction costs by using trade credit through suppliers and clients (Ferris, 1981).
This so-called transaction motive is related to the conventional features of trade credit
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usage, such as saving transaction costs, signaling product quality nand screening out
inferior material. Thus large firms, less constrained by bank loans and more credit available,
are able to facilitate firms to made deals with suppliers or clients. Secondly, another
alternative trade credit theory has emerged in recent studies. This alternative theory states
that trade credit used for financing becomes more desirable when the availability of other
options is scarce. Firms use trade credit as an external source of financing that may
substitute for bank loans, as small firms are running out of bank debts when the economy
is in a bad state. The financing motive for the trade credit usage is more common for the
small firms who are more likely to be borrowing-constrained (Petersen and Rajan, 1997;
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).
This paper hypothesizes that (1) firms are intended to balance trade credit flows from
suppliers to clients. This is a so-called transaction motive. (2) Financing constraint reduces
the in-stream credit flows, and as a result increases the trend of off-stream credit flows.
This external force, which is called as financing constraint, disperses the major route that is
intended from up-stream suppliers to down-stream customers. The term “in-stream flows”
refers to firms’ trade credit lending in its natural channel that connects suppliers and
customers. Diversion is a shift from origin to destination, where less trade credit flows into
firms’ customers, especially for those borrowing-constrained firms. Diversion is obtained
by subtracting accounts receivable from payable. The two forces (transaction and financing)
either aid or resist the flow’s movement from origin to destination, and the resistance to
the movement thereby advances a diversion for self-financing.
Two reasons support my study: (1) Most previous studies show evidence for one of the
two motives, but rarely examine both motives. This leaves readers in doubt about the
effect of one motive on trade credit in a presence of the other. So far, there are few studies
concerning the two motives for the use of trade credit by comparing large and small
firms. My paper serves as an initial attempt to test whether or not both financing and
transaction motives account for trade credit resources allocation. (2) To my knowledge,
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this is the first time to take into account both diversion and in-stream flows of trade credit
into analysis. A discussion is made on the extent to which borrowing constraint attracts
trade credit from its conventional flow (from suppliers to clients). Further, another goal is
to assess the extent to which large firms characterized by transaction motive focus their
efforts on keeping a substantial amount of trade credit in a conventional way.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follow: In Section 2, a review of the literature
concerning the different motives in use of trade credit for small and large firms is presented.
Section 3 introduces models devised for transaction process and financing process, and
then describes data. The results are shown and interpreted in Section 4. Finally, the
conclusion is given in Section 5.
Motive of Trade Credit Usage for Small and Large Firms
By reviewing the literature, this section is focused on the reason why different sized firms
behave differently towards trade credit usage. For each motive, the related literature is
reviewed by a comparison of the motive between large and small firms.
A Variety of Financing Sources
The upper part of Figure 1 shows trade credit flows where trade credit acceptance
determines the availability of trade credit to clients. The so-called transaction motive
becomes weak as the channels of financing are blocked. Therefore, it is necessary to
explain the explicit channels of financing. The lower part of Figure 1 shows the channels
of financing. In general, a firm raises money internally and externally. With regard to the
internal financing, it is straightforward that firm raises money by making profits, then, the
firm invests capital in market. However, a firm during an expansion needs more money
than its internal financing supplies, so it seeks external financing. To be specific, there are
three ways as displayed in Figure 1 to raise money from outside the company: borrowing
from a bank, issuing bonds, or issuing equity in the stock market. Oftentimes, it is not easy
to seek funds from an equity market, though, even if they are profitable. Needless to say,
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small firms get worse financially as the external financing channels are blocked.

Small Firms Substitute Receivables for Bank Loans
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) state that small firms should provide trade credit to their buyers,
but due to financing limitations, they fail to do so. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) provide
the proof of theories that it is more common in low- and medium-wealth firms to use
trade credit for self-financing, but it is rarely seen in large firms.9 As shown in Table 1, for
small and medium firms, the demand for funds exceeds a maximum supply by banks. It
ends up with a strong credit shortage in financing, which causes the vendor financing to
serve as an alternative source of funds (0<TC  TC ). In this context, trade credit becomes
more desirable as the availability of other options is less likely to satisfy the needs. No
matter their sizes, firms rank bank debts as their first-choice (BC= BC ), then get back to
trade credit as an alternative source of funds.

Figure 2.1 The relationship map of firm, suppliers, clients, and bank

9

The discussion about the appropriate wealth categories are not involved in this paper.
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Table 2.1
The Usages of Trade Credit and Bank Credit as a Source of
Self-Financing for Different Sized Firms
High Wealth

Medium

Low wealth

wealth
Bank Credit Usage in Financing

BC< BC

BC= BC

BC= BC

Trade Credit Usage in Financing

TC=0

TC< TC

TC= TC

BC—bank credit used for financing.
BC -- maximum loans given by bank
TC – trade credit for financing.
TC -- maximum trade credit given by firms’ suppliers

Note: Source from Cunningham(2004)

Three reasons are responsible for the financing troubles in small firms. (1) Credit rationing:
Banks may follow a set of screening criteria that detect risky firms, such as increasing
interest in debt, and specifying terms of a contract (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Banks screen
out the risky small firms by perceiving a lower probability of repayment.10 Large firms,
selected by the banks, are assumed to be less risky in financing. (2) Monetary tightening:
Banks restricts bank reserves during a period of tight monetary policy. A monetary
tightening forces banks to contract bank credit growth. This contraction may result in a
lack of financing for small firms that do not have access to bond and equity markets.
(Berger and Udell, 2002; Nielsen, 2002). (3) Financing disturbances: The disturbances of
financing are severe in small firms when debt financing is flexibly suspended and resumed
over time (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In this context, small firms are more vulnerable to the
financing disturbances as banks are relevantly less tolerant towards small firms in terms of
how much risk to undertake.
As discussed earlier, this paper focuses efforts on the presence of diversion away from the
conventional route of trade credit where the majority of trade credit flows continuously
A higher interest rate is associated with a lower probability of repayment. Banks screen out the higher
risk firms by charging them a higher interest rate.
10
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from suppliers to firms’ clients.
Large Firms Advance the Release and Circulation of Trade Credit
In contrast to small firms, large firms are more willing to offer trade credit to clients.
Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) illustrate the difference in vendor financing between
small and large firms: trade credit is widely used in small firms for the purpose of
self-financing as they are running out of bank debts, whereas large firms use trade credit for
the purpose of transaction. Estimates conducted by Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that
large firms have a relatively higher ratio of trade credit (receivables plus payables) to sales
than small firms do11. A high ratio indicates that trade credit works well throughout the
entire process of transaction. A low ratio is associated with a suspension or decline in
trade credit during the transaction. A high-ratio of trade credit to sales in large firms is due
to the fact that large firms are more willing to save transaction costs. Ferris (1981)
addresses the issue that trade credit provides the information about cash the firms need
to repay for each transaction. This information helps firms to improve cash management,
and thus it saves transaction costs.

From our analysis so far, the spread of trade credit is based on the assumption that firms
are less constrained by bank loan. An investigation of transaction motive is thus conducted
on large firms that are characterized by relatively low financial constraint. In order to better
assess the effect of financial constraint, a comparison then is made on small firms who are
more likely to be constrained.

Model and Data
Model Setup for the Transaction Motive
The first model tests the transaction motive where most (but not all) of trade credit is
widely used for the purpose of business transactions, as opposed to financing. The extent,
Petersen and Rajan(1997) point out that the transaction motive is prevalent in large-wealth firms.
However, they do not verify their hypothesis on large-wealth firms due to the limitation of their dataset.
11
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however, varies in different sized firms. Model 1 is proposed with a focus on in-stream
credit flows and investigates the smoothness of the credit flows by controlling the
presence of financing constraint12. The smoothness is defined by the extent to which the
firms can offer credit to their clients.

ARit    i  1Enit  2 I nit  3Tnit  4Onit  5 APit * Crisis   it    (1)
where i and t index firms and time periods respectively, and the n subscript refers to the nth
variable of each group;  is an intercept term;  controls for firm-specific and
time-invariant effect controlling for heterogeneity;  is an i.i.d error term. Designate the
vector of grouped independent variables for ith firm at time t as I it' , Eit' , Tit' and Oit' , where
I it' = ( I1it , I 2it , I3it , ... I nit ) , Eit' = (E1it , E 2it ,E3it ...E nit ) , Tit' = (T1it , T2it , T 3it ,...Tnit ) and Oit'

= (O1it ,O2it , O 3it ,...Onit ) . The vector I it' incorporates a set of variables related to internal
financing—income (INC), cash flow (CF), and liquidation (LIQ). The vector Eit' is
established to capture the sources of external financing, including bank loans (BL), and
stock and bonds (SB). The vector Tit' is simply the amount of trade credit
inflow—accounts payable (AP). As the last vector Oit' , it reflects the establishment and
development of up to 9 industries, measured by industry growth rate from 2002 to 2008
(IndGR). The circulation mechanism in Equation 1 is proposed against the diversion
mechanism shown in Model 2.

Model Setup for the Financing Motive
Model 2 tests the hypothesis 2 that borrowing constraint directly results in a diversion of
trade credit flows.

NetTCit    i  1 Eit  2 Iit  3Oit  4 BLit * Crisis   it    (2)
Where NetTC is the surplus of trade credit by subtracting receivables (AR) from payables
To control the presence of financial pressure, the tests in this paper are conducted on large and small
firms separately. The smaller firms are assumed to receive more financing pressure.
12
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(AP). The definitions of the other variables are analogous to those of Equation 1.

In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, this paper differs from Meltzer (1960)13 in
two respects. Firstly, some changes are needed due to a new framework of this paper where
both financing and transaction variables are examined. Secondly, in the present paper, a
closer look is taken at the diversion of trade credit that is supposed to be associated with
self-financing. The descriptions for the variables are listed in Table 2 where the
independent variables are categorized by external financing, internal financing, transaction,
and operation.

It is necessary to give justifications for the independent variable selections. First, the cash
flow statement, refers to a cash basis report on financial activities 14. This cash statement
includes only inflow and outflow of cash activity during a time period. Thus, in this respect
it is believed to measure the current financial status of a firm more efficiently in terms of
liquidity15 than other financial statements (Helfert, 2001). Moreover, Almeide, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004) adopt the cash flow sensitivity (A firm’s propensity to save cash out
of cash flow) to capture the financial constraint that a firm is enduring. They find that
firms with positive cash flow sensitivities (have a propensity) desire to expand, but the
availability of funds constrains a firm’s investment demand. Negative cash flow
sensitivities (no propensity) cause firms to become defensive. Positive cash flow
sensitivities suggest profitability and, therefore, desire to expand, but the opposite is a sign
of weakness or overgrown expansion. It is, therefore, proposed that a profitable firm with
positive cash flow might offer more credit for their clients in an attempt to expand their
size.

13
14
15

Meltzer (1960) examined the determinants of net trade credit and its response to monetary policy.
These financing activities include operating activities, investing activities, and financing activities.
See Matolcsy,Z.,Booth,P. and Wider, B., 2005.
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Table 2.2
The Descriptions for the Dependent Variables and Independent Variables
Variables:

Measurements:

Dependent Variables:
Net Trade Credit

(NetTC)

The diversion of trade credit: AP-AR

Accounts Receivable

(AR)

The amount of AR

Independent Variables:
(1)Financing Variables
(I+E)
Internal Financing

Income

Subtracting expenses from gross earnings

(I)

Net Cash Flow

Cash receipts minus cash payments given a
year

Liquidation:

Subtracting cash and short-term investment
from current liability.

External Financing

Bank Loans

Long term debt from bank and financial

(E)

institutions
Bonds and Stocks

Shares that have been purchased by
investors outside of the firm.

(2) Transaction Variable (T)
Accounts Payable

The amount of AP

(3) Operating Variable (O)
Industrial Growth rate

The Sales growth rate in certain industries

Second, LIQ measures the risk of liquidation by subtracting cash and short-term
investment from the current liability. Slightly different from Meltzer (1960), instead I take
the difference between term “cash” and “current liability”, rather than the ratio. The
reason for this change is that this model is designed to be scaled by volume, and this
modification allows me to evaluate the effect of certain measures in the same level. Third,
INC is the net income to sensor the operating performance. Fourth, BL is the long-term
debt provided by banks or other financial institutions. Fifth, SB is the stock and bonds
issued by firm.

Sixth, the recent attention is paid to the importance of trade credit on economic
development. Fisman and Love (2003) find that less developed industries or countries
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highly depend on trade credit, signaled by a higher ratio of accounts payable to total assets.
It is indicated that the industrial development is associated with the trade credit usage. A
similar finding provided by Herbst (1974) states that industry factors, such as trend, and
seasonal issues, are contributing factors for the availability of trade credit lending. After
reviewing literature above, industry growth rate as a good indicator should be able to
measure the industrial development. The next thing that happens is that I have to make a
choice from two sets of data regarding industrial growth rate: the overall industrial growth
rate and growth rate within industry. It is noticed from Smith and Smith (1999), who
conducted a study on trade credit usage in inter-firm trade, that the variance across
industries is much bigger than that within industries in the panel data regression. A
similar result from the data of this paper is shown in Table 3, where the ratio of accounts
payable (or accounts receivable) to total assets varies across industries. The three highest
ratios are observed in agriculture, wholesale trade and manufacturing while the two lowest
are in finance, insurance and real estate, and services. It is apparent that the cross-sectional
variation of this ratio is high in this sample. Among the ratios, the highest (0.15) is 15
times as high as the lowest (0.01).

Table 2.3
The Level of Accounts Payable(AP) and Accounts Receivable (AR) over Total Assets across Industries
Industry
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
(2) Mining
(3) Construction
(4) Manufacturing
(5) Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and
sanitary service
(6) Wholesale trade
(7) Retail trade
(8) Finance, insurance and real estate
(9) Services
Note: the calculation was made from the data of this paper.
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AP/total
assets
0.09
0.09
0.01
0.11
0.03

AR/total
assets
0.15
0.07
0.03
0.12
0.03

0.09
0.15
0.02
0.02

0.09
0.08
0.02
0.03

To minimize the cross-sectional variation, the model will incorporate the industrial
growth rate (IndGR) within industry, categorized by U.S. SIC industry codes.

Data
With the exception of the dummy, all of the variables above are measured in one million
U.S. dollars. Firm-level data is taken from Worldscope and Onesource database for Hong
Kong firms, which provide the data from a set of financial statements, and general
information. Hong Kong, as a great financial and trade center of Asia, thrives on its
advanced financial industry, as well as an exported-oriented economy. These features of
Hong Kong match this paper’s emphasis on transaction and financing motives. Also,
much attention recently falls on the rise of Asia. The paper serves as a new look at Asian
economy.

The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2008, which contains the recent financial crisis
starting 2008. A dummy variable is therefore needed to detect a structural change in each
model during the crisis. In this context, I generated dummy variables and interactions to
support the hypotheses in this paper. I scored one to the dummy if it is the year of
2008—the onset of the global financial crisis, otherwise, I scored zero. It is interesting to
compare the financing and transaction motives during the pre-onset and onset of the crisis.
The interaction terms are therefore interacted with bank loans and accounts payable in
Equations 1 and 2, respectively. The terms are obtained by multiplying the dummy and
bank loans, or by the dummy and accounts payable.

There is no standard to define the firms’ sizes. For example, an automobile company, with
very large share of market sales, may be not profitable. In this case, the size of this
company changes by the different definitions—profitability or sales. Thus, it is
inappropriate to impose a unique criterion of measurement for overall industries or
countries that are less or more developed. Also, the U.S. Census Bureau does not define
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small or large business, but provides advices that allow users to define business categories
in any of several ways: (1) employers and nonemployers, (2) employment size of firms, (3)
employment size of establishments, or (4) profits of firms. An alternative method adopted
in previous literature is to seek arbitrary assigned thresholds, such as a critical percentile 16
of size in sample data.
According to the U.S. census bureau17, firms with less than 500 employees are relatively
small, and with more than 2500 are relatively large. Four perspectives on this criteria
selection are present: (1) Dataset in this paper provides the information on employment
size of firms (Method 2). No information about either unemployment (Method 1) or
establishments (Method 3) is covered by this dataset. (2) Method 4 is arranged in a
robustness check. I repeat the tests using profitability as an alternative measure of firms’
sizes. The results are substantially robust to the measures of firm size used 18. (3) Seeking a
critical percentile might be biased or skewed if the sample data is not large enough to
represent the population or the data size changes with different specifications. (4) The
thresholds in this paper are consistent with those in previous analyses of European and
Canadian markets (Bednarzik, 2000; Baldwin, Jarmin, and Tang, 2004). These applications
provide a way of dealing with the firms’ sizes on foreign markets.
Estimation Results
An econometric approach selected in this paper should be efficient to evaluate the two
equations. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is thereby employed, since SUR is more
efficient than OLS when the disturbance terms in different equations are correlated
(Zellner, 1962). OLS ignores the possibility that two different dependent variables across
equations may be correlated, and thus the residuals are correlated. It is that the disturbance
The criterion for definition of large firm varies in previous studies. It depends on the specifications I
am interested in. For example, Blaso (2005) defines the low wealth firms below 55th percentile of profit
in the sample data. On the contrary, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) design 30th percentile of sales as cutoff
for small and large firms. Moreover, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) discuss firms’ debt
maturity by dividing the firms into quartiles by value of total assets.
17 The U.S. census bureau separates three tiers of the firms’ size: the firms with employees less than 500,
less than 2500 but more than 500, and greater than 2500.
18 A result on the robustness check is attached in Appendix B.
16
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of in-stream flows and off-stream flows are correlated with each other. The correlations
between the residuals of Equations 1 and 2 are shown in Tables 4 and 5. It can be seen that
the disturbances between the residuals of Equations 1 and 2 are highly significant at 1
percent confidence level, for both small and large firms. The estimation of SURE is
thereby necessary since the correlations of disturbances exhibit the violation of OLS.

Table 2.4
Correlation between Residuals of Equation 1 and 2 for Small Firms
Equation1

Equation 2

Equation 1

1

-0.478***

Equation 2

-0.478***

1

The correlation is tested for significance using a standard T-test, where the null hypothesis
is that the two disturbances are not correlated.
*** p<0.01

Table 2.5
Correlation between Residuals of Equation 1 and 2 for Large Firms
Equation 1

Equation 2

Equation 1

1

-0.672***

Equation 2

-0.672***

1

The correlation is tested for significance using a standard T-test, where the null hypothesis
is that the two disturbances are not correlated.
*** p<0.01
Table 6 shows the results of estimating the parameters of the Model 1 for both large and
small firms using SURE. By checking the 1st column, the variables measuring profitability
are significantly and positively related to trade credit lending, where a one-unit increase in
income, cash flow, and liquidation, raises 0.101, 0.090, and 0.017 units of accounts
receivable respectively.

Large firms increase 0.051 units (column 1) of trade credit availability to their clients in
responding a one-unit increase of bank loan, whereas the small increase 0.203 (column 3).
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The marginal effect of bank loans for small firms (0.203) is 4 times greater than for large
firms (0.051), indicating that compared with large firms, small firms are more sensitive to
the bank loans. Work is needed to extend the method to accommodate regressions with
interaction term—bank loans and financial crisis. The inclusion of interaction term enters
into Column 2 and 4 for large and small firms. During the onset of financial crisis, the
marginal effect of bank loans reduces significantly from 0.051 to 0.019 in large firms
whereas the effect falls significantly from 0.203 to -0.109. This reduction during the crisis is
due to the fact that firms no matter their sizes in crisis period are unwilling to sacrifice their
resource (bank loan) to make more trade credit available for their clients.
Interestingly, for those large firms, one-unit increase in trade credit inflow (payables)
stimulates the outflow (receivables) by 0.654 units. But for those small firms, one-unit
increase in inflow drives the outflow only by 0.187 units, which is about 4 times smaller
than that of large firms. Small firm’s transit less trade credit from suppliers to customer
clients, indicating a proportion of vendor credit is used for other purpose. A force,
so-called self-financing, appears in small firms and resists the movement of credit flows
from the suppliers to clients. This finding supports the hypothesis 2 mentioned concerning
a partial diversion of trade credit inflow.

A test for an interaction term between payables and financial crisis is also undertaken. The
regressions with the interaction terms are located in column 2 and 4 for small and large
firms respectively. In small firms, the interaction term—payables*dummy—are statistically
significant and positive at a 5 percent confident level. It is worth noting that a one-unit
increase in payables only raises the credit outflow by 0.113 units in crisis period—which is
much less than that in rest of year where the marginal effect is 0.213. For large firms, credit
acceptance (payables) during the financial crisis has no significant effect to advance trade
credit to clients. This contradiction is explained as the result of financing constraint during
the financial crisis. Financial crisis has a stronger influence on small firms due to a fact that
small firms are more likely be debt-rationed. The industrial growth rate shows a positive
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relation with the trade credit outflows, but no statistical significance is shown in neither of
groups.

Table 2.6
Determinants of Trade Credit in-Stream Flows (AR) of Model 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Net Income
Cash Lag
Liquidation
Bank Loans
Shares and Stocks
Payables
Industrial Growth Rate

Large

Large

Small

Small

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.101***

0.089***

0.076***

0.047**

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.024)

(0.023)

0.090***

0.093***

0.055*

0.071**

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.032)

(0.030)

0.017**

0.018***

0.021

0.026

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.018)

(0.018)

0.051***

0.057***

0.203***

0.294***

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.020)

(0.021)

0.005***

0.005***

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.654***

0.661***

0.187***

0.213***

(0.016)

(0.019)

(0.022)

(0.025)

24.317

23.095

10.089

8.254

(35.557)

(35.431)

(10.154)

(9.492)

Payables*Dummy
Bank loans*Dummy
Constant

-0.029

-0.100**

(0.032)

(0.044)

-0.038**

-0.403***

(0.016)

(0.044)

-1.186

0.723

0.203

1.300

(3.996)

(4.046)

(1.287)

(1.211)

Observations

826

826

651

651

No. of I.d.

118

118

93

93

System Weighted R-Square

0.744

0.744

0.249

0.312

Dummy: score 1in the year of 2008--the onset of global financial crisis, otherwise, score 0.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To summarize, the main effect of the transaction factor (AP) in large firms is 4 times
greater than that in small firms. Especially at the year of 2008, with a one-unit increase in
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credit acceptance (AP) in small firms, credit lending (AR) decreases by -0.100 units. These
findings in this paper suggest that transaction motive serves as a major driving force in
large firms, but not in small firms.

Table 7 presents the estimation result for Model 2. By examining the first column of Table
7, it is apparent that the liquidation are significantly correlated with the trade credit
diversion, indicating that a one-unit increase in the liquidation is associated with a 0.025
and 0.185 increase in units of diversion for both large and small firms. The diversion for
self-financing flows out as the liquidation pressure19 becomes more pronounced in small
firms. But for the first column, large firms are less sensitive to the liquidation pressure and
there is only 0.025 units increase in the diversion, 8 times smaller than that of small firms.
In addition, the diversion in either group is inversely related to income and cash flow,
indicating that a slow money turnover is associated with the needs of self-financing. It is
that a one-unit decrease in cash flow is associated with 0.090 or 0.106 units increase in
diversion for large and small firms.

Bank loans have a significantly negative coefficient -0.021 (column 1) and-0.241 (column 3)
for large and small firms. The statistics imply that a reduced bank debt makes more trade
credit flowing out for self-financing no matter the firms’ size. It is that diversion of trade
credit increases by 0.021 (0.241) for every unit drop in bank debt for large firms (small
firms). The amount of diversion in small firms is 12 times greater than that in large firms.
In addition, this finding for Model 2 supports the assumption of Model 1 in which small
firms offers less trade credit lending to clients in the presence of bank lending constraints.
This result provides a vision of financing motive that reduces the ability of small firms to
offer trade credit to their client during the financial crisis.

19

Dichev (1998) uses the liquidation as a proxy for bankruptcy.
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Table 2.7
Determinants of Trade Credit Diversion (NetTC) of Model 2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Net Income
Cash Lag
Liquidation
Bank Loans
Shares and Stocks
Industrial Growth Rate

Large

Large

Small

Small

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.108***

-0.096***

-0.045

0.000

(0.021)

(0.022)

(0.051)

(0.050)

-0.090***

-0.092***

-0.106*

-0.127**

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.067)

(0.065)

0.025**

0.023**

0.185***

0.171***

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.037)

(0.036)

-0.021**

-0.029***

-0.241***

-0.361***

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.042)

(0.046)

-0.009***

-0.009***

(0.002)

(0.002)

18.557

19.339

-4.715

-2.022

(52.077)

(51.990)

(21.207)

(20.589)

Bank loans*Dummy
Constant

0.044*

0.554***

(0.024)

(0.094)

0.708

-1.084

-1.196

-2.837

(5.861)

(5.930)

(2.688)

(2.624)

Observations

826

826

651

651

No. of I.d.

118

118

93

93

System Weighted R-Square

0.744

0.744

0.249

0.312

Dummy: score 1in the year of 2008--the onset of global financial crisis, otherwise, score 0.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusion
This paper presents the studies of financing motives and transaction motives conducted
on large and small firms separately. An initial attempt was made to incorporate two models
measuring two components of trade credit outflow—trade credit acceptance and lending.
Estimation of linearly SURE are developed under two processes with a comparison of
different sized groups. The empirical results give evidence on the hypotheses of this paper
and assess other factors such as industrial growth rate, and financial crisis.
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This paper performs an empirical study on the existence of different motives in usage of
trade credit. Two models are formulated to predict the diversion and in-stream flows.
Model 1 is to examine the in-stream flows behavior that is characterized by a transaction
motive. In this study of transaction motive, the main effect of the transaction variable (AP)
in large firms is 4 times greater than that observed in small firms. This result supports one
of hypotheses in this paper that as can easily be seen, the transaction motive enables large
firms to screen out inferior material from their suppliers, signal product quality to their
clients, as well as save transaction costs for themselves. On the other side, small firms are
more likely to be credit rationed and as a result divert a substantial proportion of vendor
credit for self-financing. In Model 2 serving as a probe of flow diversion, it is found that
the amount of diversion in small firms is 12 times greater than that in large firms. This
result indicates that credit rationing as the major driving force result in a diversion toward
self-financing in small firms, but has little effect in large firms.

As a matter of fact, firms may apply trade credit to stimulate sales through the creation of
trade credit lending. However, for most loan-restricted firms, vendor credit can smooth out
the impact of tightening monetary policy. It is necessary to ensure the flow of trade credit
through suppliers, firms, to custom firms. Ways are suggested in which trade credit can be
beneficial to both seller and buyer: (1) To better serve down-steam firms, firms should
offer vendor credit on a selective basis. Firms should reduce the unexpected trade credit
outflows as means of self-financing in costumer firms. (2) To make the trade credit chain
smooth, down-stream firms collect cash from buyers quickly to pay off upstream firms.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK PERCEPTION AND RISKY ASSET
SHARE IN RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
Introduction
The primary objective of this paper is to discuss the little-known relationship between risk
perception and risky asset allocation in pension plans. A variety of traditional pension
plans, like the defined benefit plan, are devised to protect employees with a predictable
monthly benefit at retirement. With the increasing of participants, a shift has taken place to
meet the shifting demands on a higher pension accompanied by a relatively higher risk. In
this context, a majority of employees are therefore covered by a defined contribution plan
as opposed to a defined benefit plan mentioned earlier. Different from the traditional
pension plans, the defined contribution plan is no longer insured by Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). We know, as a matter of fact, that benefit in a defined
contribution plan when retired might be lower than that in a defined benefit plan, especially
when the market remains depressed for prolonged periods. Recent studies (Samwick and
Skinner, 2004; Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise, 2006) also voiced the same concern about
the massive capital inflows from risk-vulnerable participants who are less experienced. The
trend of pension plans is requiring a combination of defined benefit plan and defined
contribution plan. Most employers currently offer only defined contribution plan.
Participants in this plan decide the share of risk asset and adjust the proportion of risk
factor at will. Defined contribution plan is a lifecycle saving associated with an expected
value on returns and unpredicted risk. It is hypothesized that investors may adjust the
proportion of risky assets in their portfolio (increase or decrease) as they perceive a market
boom or bust, or the potential risks surrounding investors’ health situation.
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Hudson-Wilson (2000) once generalized three types of investors who are return
maximizers, portfolio risk reducers, and inflation hedgers. Different from earlier studies on
this topic with an emphasis on speculation, this paper sheds lights on risky investment
choice made by risk reducers and inflation hedgers. These groups of investors carry a
substantial amount of capital, with less optimistic expectations or risk neutral preferences,
primarily hedges against depreciation while buying stocks and bonds. The so-called hedger
intends to select relatively lower risky assets and as a result make less significant gains.
However, the motive of these investors has received less attention, even though recent
studies suggest that it may play an important role in explaining the risk decision-making
behavior. This paper is confined to these retirement account holders who are characterized
by being less speculative. The idea of this paper is explored based on the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) beta, a parameter measuring the correlation between market return
and asset return. Investors know the estimated CAPM beta20 and therefore keep less risky
assets once they are exposed to potential risks disproportionately. Investors have to take
into consideration a wide range of risk factors when they make choice on portfolio
allocation. This paper explores the risk factors surrounding investors and then analyzes the
corresponding investors’ reaction when individual are exposed to risk factors. Risk
perception is related to some recognition on a matter of health, inflation pressure, and
economy. Investors who anticipate a high likelihood of risks or crisis will as a result shift
the portfolio composition and relevant risky components to undertake in stock market.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces recent workers participation
in a defined contribution plan. In Section 3, I review literature relevant to risk factors that
may impact on an investor’s portfolio choice. Section 4 builds model and gains further
insights into the structure and function of this model. The data source and statistics are
provided in section 5. Section 6 contains an empirical application to a binary logistic model.
The final section concludes.

20

The estimated CAPM beta is resolved by regressing an asset return on a market return.
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Background
Allocation of Risky Asset in 401(K) Retirement Account
In general, investors wish to avoid any adverse factors that would lower their expected
return. To reduce the volatility of equity returns, a change in risky components is required
to cope with the crisis. Official statistics from the Employee Benefit Research Institute
(EBRI) and the Investment Company Institute (ICI) in Figure 1 show that from the
selected years of 1996 to 2009, participants in 401K plan hold the share of stock market
investment with a minimum of 47 percent in 2008 and a maximum of 71 percent in 1999.21
Needless to say, the share of risky assets is thought to be greater if it includes the balanced
fund, which is a hybrid fund with a mix of bonds and stock. From this perspective, it is
necessary for this study to move to a focus on risky asset share, since it is capable to capture
most of bulk asset flow. It is worth noting that, as the economy worsens, the proportion of
risky assets plummets. Figure 1 reviews evidence on the effect of recessions that occurred
in 2001 and 2008 and consequently dramatic drops in risky assets, drawing on
macro-economic evidence. It indicates that participants perceived crisis-awareness of
exposures to an ongoing or forthcoming recession, and readiness to protect themselves
from any unexpected volatility of markets.

21

Stock market investment is a direct sum of Equity Funds and Company Stock.
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Source: A report on 401(K) retirement account is provided by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute (EBRI) and the Investment Company Institute (ICI).

Figure 3.1 Variation in the share of different funds in fund-holder's account from 1996 to
2009

The Older Population Holds More Wealth than the Rest
The paper is restricted to employed people aged 40 years or older accumulating
considerable pension wealth. The considerable pension wealth encourages its owner to be
extremely cautious of potential risk, especially millions of people nearing retirement in fear
of stock market crash. As seen from Figure 2, fund-holders aged between 40 and 60 years
account for a high percent of wealth assets in each income interval—that is 71 percent, 48
percent, and 91 percent in low-, medium-, and high-income stratum. Let us turn to the
rightmost group of Figure 2. It is interesting to note that the top wealth-holders with an
account balance of 100,000 dollars or more, aggregated approximately 91 percent wealth
lying in the age group of 40 years old or above in 2009. On the contrary, participants aged
40 or more possess less, but still a substantial amount of wealth (48 percent) in a
low-wealth group of 10,000 dollars. As a matter of fact, the older has a clear advantage
over the younger, no matter what quantile of wealth distribution they belong to. At this
point, a life-cycle saving is somehow capable of explaining the age-wealth pattern
presented in Figure 2. In the remainder of this paper, I intend to devote and focus
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attention on the participants aged 40 or above. Meeting the needs of this paper, I use the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) database to study the well-being of respondents with
a focus on a group of people aged 40 years or above (mean and median ages of 49.4 and
48.4).
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Figure 3.2 The share of participants’ wealth of 401k account, grouped by age

Literature
CAPM Model
The CAPM provides important insights about risk-averse behavior in matters of
uncertainty. The expected return in CAPM consists of two components: risk-free asset
return, and risk asset return. A higher value of Beta, indicating the extent of correlation
between risky assets and whole market, could determine a higher expected return of
investment.
E(Ri )  R f  i (E(Rm )  R f )

i 

(1)

Cov ( ri , rM )

(2)

m

2
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Where

 i is a measure of systematic risk, rm is an expected return of market, ri is an

expected return of assets, and  m2 is the variance of market returns. As a measure of
volatility, beta coefficient indicates a correlation between market risk and asset risk. The
CAPM model emphasizes the diversity of portfolio of assets so that systematic risk is
more likely to represent the risk of portfolio. To minimize the unsystematic risk that is
associated with individual’s preference on asset selection, it is required to diversify the
variety of asset so that risk exposure is limited to market only. By understanding of CAMP
model, account holders may reduce the share of unsystematic risk when they perceive the
level of risks to be high.

Risk-tolerant investors therefore accept a certain proportion of risky assets (such as stock
and bonds), as opposed to the risk-free assets (treasury bills). Investors may lower their
holdings of risk assets or the percentage of risky assets in a total when risk grows
disproportionately faster than the expected returns.

Risk Attitude versus Risk Perception
A number of recent papers study the impact of risk factors on account holders. Instead of
summarizing this literature, I refer the reader to Hariharan, Chapman, and Domian (2000)
which shows that risk tolerant investors nearing retirement increase the proportion of
risky asset, buying more stock. They estimated the response of risky asset shares as
individuals change their risk attitudes. However they underestimate the importance of risk
perception as a contributing factor in investment decisions. Risk perception, which stresses
the risk awareness, is at least equally as important as risk attitude. Weber and Milliman
(1997) stated that “the tendency to be attracted or repelled by alternatives that he or she
perceives as more risky over alternatives perceived as less risky.” Cognitive variables, such
as risk perception, and a sense of control, may account for the willingness or participation
in a financial investment. A strong argument proposed by Sitkin and Weingart (1995) states
that “the direct impact of antecedent variables on risky decision-making actually takes
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place only via the mediating function of risk propensity and risk perception.” As seen in
Figure 3, Sitkin and Weingart introduce two exogenous variables affecting investors’
propensity and perception: outcome history and problem framing. In this context, an
individual’s tendency to take or avoid risks is subject to outcome history which makes
people feel confident or doubtful in a mental state. A person may behave actively and
passively from the external environment. Problem framing, that is a relevance of previous
experiences, would be supportive of individual involvement in risky activities. Needless to
say, the expected utility (EU) framework has been theoretically challenged with the
argument that risk attitude by its own is not sufficient enough to account for risk
decision-making behavior.

Source from Sitkin and Weingart (1995)

Figure 3.3 Mediated model of the determinants of risky decision-making behavior

This paper sheds light on the role and impact of risk perception on an individual’s
investment choice. Retirement account is expected to provide smoothly long-run growing
benefits while offsetting the environmental changes, such as inflation, inadequate funding,
natural disasters, unexpected illness, or other obstructions. However, only a few papers in
practice have dealt with the analysis of stock investment as a hedge against inflation when
investors participate in pension plans. Even fewer of them discuss the risk perception that
was of concern to hedger investors.

Financial Investment and Life-cycle Savings
Skinner (1988) argued that precautionary savings and uncertain income account for most
aspects of life cycle savings. First, household saves for a rainy day against a bad state.
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Investors are concerned primarily with well-being, which is subject to uncertain events,
such as crisis, or health deterioration. (Kotlikoff, 2008; Starr-Mccluer, 1996; Chou, Liu, and
Huang, 2004); Peek(1983) discusses two sources in saving plans: (1) Expected net capital
gains on financial assets and (2) unexpected net capital gains on financial assets. In fact,
Peek’s insight is based on the CAMP model that expected income (or loss) is primarily
contingent on systematic risk of market conditions. The deviation from balanced growth
path may lead to the unexpected events, such as inflation, financial crisis, or job-loss. For
instance, a worker who was previously employed and laid off from his last job is more
likely to experience income loss during economic downturns. In fact, the unpredicted
adverse events may affect stock market return and subsequently change individual’s
well-being and benefits. Following the classification proposed by Peek (1983), this study
performs to examine the effect of risky perceptions on precautionary behavior when they
re-allocate the share of risky asset in a portfolio.

A family’s consumption level is subject to uncertain income over which the family has no
control (Browning and Crossley, 2001; Mendelson and Amihud, 1982). Morduch (1995)
emphasizes that the income levels and consumption levels are non-separable. Families
usually tend to make consumption decisions by accumulating or depleting financial assets.
Other researchers (Bayoumi and Macdonald, 1995) illustrate a phenomenon that families
tend to use financial assets to smooth consumption no matter if the financial market is less
or well developed. This view is reinforced by Morduch (1995) saying that income
smoothing is contingent on different aspects of risks. In general, it consists of risk attitude,
perception, and a variety of consumption controlling mechanisms. This argument strongly
supports the hypothesis of this paper that workers may adjust allocation of retirement
accounts against uncertain income and risks.
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Model
In this paper, I apply a multivariable binary logistic model in which only two of the possible
outcomes of change (more or less investment in stock market if investors changed their
allocation since the last period) are discussed.

A '  ln(

A

1  A

)   0    m P ercpm    n X n

(3)

Where A is binary values measuring how have you changed allocation on stock?
Score 1 if invest more on stock market, and -1 if invest less. P ercp is a set of risky
variables with an inclusion of health status, inflation perception, and crisis perception.
The respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they feel worried or concerned
regarding a prospective crisis, and inflation. X enters this model as control variables, such
as education, age, and sex to increase the efficiency of estimation.

Risk perception is underestimated, or at least not explicitly considered in the classic
Expected Utility framework that builds on risk attitude. An extension of the classic
expected utility framework is proposed to emphasize the fact that investors may change
the risky asset share as the market conditions changed.

Consider for instance the following case: You are offered to play a game of chance. A
fair coin is tossed repeatedly until you get a first head, at which point the game ends and
you get a prize. The prize “pot” starts at 1 dollar, and increases by m dollar (m is constant)
in successive trials until you get a head. To enter the game, you must pay n dollars for a
ticket. For example, if you toss a coin three times, and it comes up tails the first two
times and ends up with a head. You have won a prize of 2+m dollars. Thus, the value of
the losses or gains is associated with the net value of prize and ticket (2+m-n). Before
entering the game, the player has to estimate the expected outcome of a game against
uncertainty. If the prize goes up by 1 dollar for each consecutive head, the expected
outcome for the game specified in Equation 4 is 2 dollars. If the prize goes up by 2
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dollars, the expected outcome turns out to be 3 dollars. To simplify the description of
recursive procedure, the expected outcome in this case is m+1, where m is the additional
reward for each successful play.
1/ 2* 1  1/ 4*  2   1/ 8*  3 

n
2n

=2

(4)
1/ 2* 1  1/ 4*  3  1/ 8*  5  

2n  1
=3
2n

(5)
…
1/ 2* 1  1/ 4* 1  m   1/ 8* 1  2m  

n * m  m 1
=m+1
2n

(6)
Suppose players choose to enter two games with two different payoff structures. The
rewards for each consecutive heads in game A and B increase by 1 dollar and 2 dollars
respectively. Ticket price depends on the types of games with different payoffs. In this
case, the price is set to be 2 dollars for A and 2.5 for B. The player is likely to perceive a
higher risk in game A since the expected net gains (expected gains minus ticket price) for
A is 0, while for B it is 0.5. Players will no doubt choose to enter game B with more
expected gains. An investor decides whether to invest upon the expected gains with an
appropriate level of risk to undertake. The purpose of constructing the mathematical
model is twofold: (1) It is shown that risk perception enables investors to actively
participate in financial activities; and, (2) Risk perception, at least in some circumstances,
is more important than risk attitude.

The model mentioned above is successfully applied in practice to enlighten players to
make a wise decision. However, in other practical cases, the actual behavior is more
complex and difficult to estimate than a model which is simplified and subject to a few
explicitly stated assumptions. The difference between the perception and reality for
people who have different information precisions may vary significantly. Weber and
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Milliman (1997) stated that it could be possible for a given individual to perceive risk
differently from the same alternative or context at different times. So it is that the
precisely or imprecisely current information perceived drives the people’s decision and
behavior. In this paper, a set of perception variables measures the investor’s cognitive
ability on accurate and inaccurate information. This paper performs an analysis of risky
asset share in retirement saving plan with the inclusion of factors from a precautionary
perspective. Distinguished from the previous works, this paper attempts to illustrate that
the risk perception for a future event, such as inflation, financial crisis, even job
promotion, may affect people’s saving behavior.

Data
The data from HRS provides longitudinal information on health and economic behavior.
The most distinguishing feature of the survey is the biennially consecutive waves of
responses, initially reported in 1992. There are great needs for a consecutive study that
assesses individual behavior difference in every two years. For most participants, an event
in the last period may have direct or indirect consequences for his or her current attitudes
and behaviors toward an object. For example, suppose a participant moves to a new job
since the last time he/she was interviewed in this survey. We have reason to believe that this
respondent recently rearranged his/her account due to a new benefit plan or match rate a
new employer offers.

During the last nine years, this survey followed up and examined the behavior of
participants after being interviewed the first time. This survey is designed to provide
information from the last period as well as the current period. Interviewer asked a series of
questions concerning a comparison between the last and current period such as, “How do
you change your allocation since the last time you were interviewed?” or “Do you change
your job since the last time you were interviewed?” The answers to these comparative
questions, rather than simply have the respondents report, allow us to obtain a more
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accurate measure of information. What is more important is to raise a question concerning
the causal relationship between two events that occurred separately. We have reason to
believe that people who move into a new job are more likely to undertake a higher risk if
the person is better off with a higher wage and benefits.

In the year of 2008, this survey interviewed roughly 17,217 household participants aged
between 40 and 60 years. However, only 1380 valid observations were available for
dependent variables. All respondents were asked general question such as age, sex, and
marital status, however selective respondents were asked specific questions. The so-called
further investigation was carried on selective respondents who were interviewed and asked
a few of questions concerning specific aspects, such as work experience and expectations.
It is worth noting that the group of selective respondents varies with the types of
questions involved in this survey. It is the reason why a few control variables such as the
number of children, and the expense of children, failed to enter my analysis.

The number of observations listed in Table 1 is thereby relatively smaller than the overall
respondents investigated in 2008. I had to remove missing values on the dependent
variable that are missed for the respondent who was not asked the question. The
descriptive statistics for the truncated data is reported in Table 1.

Results
A logistic model estimates the odds ratio of risky assets versus safe assets in response to an
exposure to risk and the relative factors such as age, sex, and education. As seen from Table
2, years of education and sex are significantly related to the recent change in retirement
assets. The coefficient 0.522 shown in Table 3 indicates that the odds ratio of investing
more on risky assets for women is 1.686 times greater than that for men. For the number
of years of education as a continuous variable, the change in the odds ratios in response to
some amount, rather than one unit of age, is of greater interest. In this way, it is interpreted
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Stock

Label
Increase or decrease stock
investigation in last year
1—increase, -1---decrease

Edu
Age
Sex

N
138
0

Me

Medi

Mis

Std

.

x

an

an

s

Dev

-1

1

-1

0

0.96

6

17

14

21

2.12

42

6.25

-0.2
9

135

completed

9

Years of age

133

30.5

71.2

49.2

48.84

8

9

0

8

7

1

2

1.58

2

0

0.49

130

93.1

00

5

60

290

557.73

0

1

0.11

0

122

0.32

1

5

2.56

3

0

0.90

0

100

20

130

22.88

0

100

50

45

31.65

1—male, 2—female
Respondent’s Annul Income
measured in one thousand
dollars.

Same job

Ma

Years of education

138
0

Income

Min

109
0

0

14.3
0

Respondent’s job title
changed in last 2 years:

125

0—not changed,

8

1—changed.
Health

Rate current health: 1—poor,
2—fair, 3—good, 4—very
good, 5—excellent.

Inflation

The expected chance of
inflation rate greater than 5%
in next 10 years.

138
0
125
0

Economi

Rate the chance us have

c

economic depression in next

133

Depressio

10 years.

5

25.1
1

55.8
1

n

that the odds ratios are decreased by 31percent for each increase of 5 years in education.
With one year increase in age, the odds ratio is reduced by 3 percent.
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Table 3.2
Raw Coefficients from Logistic Regression
Model Information
Response Variable

stock

Number of Response Levels

2

Model

binary logit

Optimization Technique

Fisher's scoring

Number of Observations Read

1380

Number of Observations Used

951
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test

Chi-Square

DF

Pr > ChiSq

Likelihood Ratio

73.115

8

<.0001

Score

52.585

8

<.0001

Wald

60.907

8

<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Standard

Wald

Error

Chi-Square

2.120

0.992

4.566

0.033 ***

1

-0.072

0.038

3.634

0.057 **

Sex

1

0.522

0.156

11.158

0.001 ***

Age

1

-0.027

0.013

4.534

0.033 ***

Annual Income

1

-0.009

0.002

16.611

<.0001***

Same job title

1

0.700

0.247

8.041

0.005 ***

Current health

1

0.096

0.093

1.082

0.298

Inflation

1

-0.012

0.003

12.448

0.000 ***

Economic Depression

1

-0.007

0.002

7.302

0.007 ***

Parameter

DF

Estimate

Intercept

1

Edu

Pr > ChiSq

For the remaining variables, the results are interpreted as follows. Workers who changed
work title recently are more likely to increase the ratio of risky assets. The odds ratio for
participants with different job titles is 2 times greater than that with the same job title. It
is believed that the reason for this higher odds ratio is related to a promotion or better
job, which brings a higher income or stronger occupational background.
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Table 3.3
Exponentiated Coefficients from Logistic Regression Results
Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect

Point Estimate

95% Wald Confidence Limits

Edu

0.930***

0.863

1.002

Sex

1.686**

1.241

2.290

Age

0.974***

0.950

0.998

Annual Income

0.991***

0.987

0.996

Same job title

2.013***

1.241

3.266

Current health

1.101

0.918

1.320

Inflation

0.988***

0.982

0.995

Economic Depression

0.993***

0.989

0.998

The inclusion of risk factors from a precautionary perspective is the primary concern of
this paper. They are generated from three aspects: (1) health risk, (2) inflation pressure,
and (3) economic depression. As shown in Table 2, worries or concerns about inflation
and the economy are certain to be significantly associated with the odds ratio. However,
the present evidence is not supportive of the hypothesis that health status is an important
risk factor for the odds of investment on risky assets. In this paper, two other variables
measuring risks are shown significant effects on odds ratios of investing more versus less.

The evidence shown in Table 3 suggests that the odds ratio of more risky assets versus
safe assets drops by 1.2 percent22 for one percent increase in the probability of inflation
greater than 5 percent. It is also interpreted that the odds ratio of investing more risky
assets reduces by 11 percent while the predicted probability of inflation grows by 10
percent. A high inflation rate, in an economic sense, is a sign of macroeconomic
instability. Investors tend to lower risky investment due to the concerns about the
abnormal inflation rate (greater than 5 percent) as a consequence of “excessive” bank
lending and speculative bubbles.

22

Odd ratio is measured by a distance from one unit.
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In this study, the prediction of economic depression shows a significant effect, being
associated with less risky investment. As expected, the odds ratio of investing more risky
assets falls by 7 percent for a 10 percent increase in the probability of crisis occurring in
the next 10 years. In general, these results support the hypothesis of this paper that risks
perceived from surroundings account for the recent change of risky asset share in
individual’s retirement assets.

Conclusion
The paper presents empirical evidence showing risk perception significantly impacts on
the portfolio composition. A shift is made in the portfolio composition from a risky asset
toward a safe asset when the investor perceives uncertainties, from either inflation or the
economy. The precautionary response individual-by-individual depends on the extent to
which an individual can feel or perceive. An investigation in this context is carried out
concerning a recent change in retirement saving account. The study is confined to
participants aged 40 or above who carry substantial savings in their retirement account.
The findings of this study show that the odds of investing more on risky assets vary
significantly by gender, education, job, and risk perception from either the economy or
inflation. Worries or concerns about a forthcoming risk and crisis significantly depress
the current activities of risky investment in pension plans.
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Appendix A
Robustness Checks
Table 1.4
Robustness Check Using Employment Size as An Alternative Measure Of Firms’ Size
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

Accounts_Payable

0.359***

0.405***

0.308***

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.036)

0.068***

0.028***

0.073***

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.008)

0.078***

0.113***

0.079***

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.015)

Liquidation
Net_income
Long_Term_Debt
Inventory

0.092***

0.109***

(0.007)

(0.009)

0.018

0.074***

0.018

(0.016)

(0.015)

(0.016)

Cashlag

0.142***
(0.012)

Payables*Dummy

0.072*
(0.043)

Long_Term_Debt*Dum

-0.036***

my
(0.014)
Constant

-0.863

-0.330

-0.897

(4.240)

(4.352)

(4.229)

Observation

707

707

707

Number of Firms

101

101

101

R-squared

0.622

0.601

0.626

Dummy: Net Cash Flow—1: positive net cash flow; 0: zero or negative net cash flow
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5
A Robustness Check Using Profitability as an Alternative Measure of Firms’ Size
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.414***

0.463***

0.487***

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.049)

0.069***

0.029***

0.068***

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.009)

0.081***

0.109***

0.081***

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.017)

VARIABLES
Accounts_Payable
Liquidation
Net_income
Long_Term_Debt
Inventory

0.096***

0.101***

(0.008)

(0.011)

0.007

0.065***

0.013

(0.018)

(0.017)

(0.018)

Cashlag

0.137***
(0.014)

Payables*Dummy

0.105**
(0.056)

Long_Term_Debt*Dummy

-0.020
(0.016)

Constant

0.928

1.840

2.490

(5.467)

(5.628)

(5.469)

Observation

546

546

546

Number of Firms

78

78

78

R-squared

0.636

0.614

0.641

Dummy: Net Cash Flow—1: positive net cash flow; 0: zero or negative net cash flow
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B
A Robustness Check Using Profitability as An Alternative Measure of Firms’ Sizes
From Table 8, the main effect of the transaction variable (AP) in large firms (0.787) is
about 6 times greater than that observed in small firms (0.129). This is robust with the
primary findings of this paper that larger firms for a purpose of transaction, transit more
credit in a conventional flow.
Table 2.8
Determinants of Trade Credit In-stream Flows (AR) of Model 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Net Income

Cash Lag
Liquidation
Bank Loans
Shares and Stocks
Payables
Industrial Growth Rate

Large

Large

Small

Small

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.090***

0.086***

0.028*

0.032**

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.018)

(0.018)

0.087***

0.086***

-0.031**

-0.032***

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

0.014*

0.015**

0.076***

0.075***

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.010)

(0.010)

0.045***

0.050***

0.074***

0.073***

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.014***

0.014***

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.787***

0.773***

0.129***

0.153***

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.013)

(0.016)

28.651

29.258

-1.601

-1.173

(44.062)

(43.891)

(5.083)

(5.054)

Payables*Dummy
Bank loans*Dummy
Constant

0.062*

-0.064**

(0.038)

(0.026)

-0.023

0.013

(0.019)

(0.010)

-1.375

-1.028

0.161

0.046

(4.998)

(5.072)

(0.648)

(0.645)

Observations

826

826

651

651

No. of I.d.

118

118

93

93
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System Weighted R-Square

0.827

0.826

0.583

0.588

Dummy: score 1in the year of 2008--the onset of global financial crisis, otherwise, score 0.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results from Table 9 are shown that small firms are much more sensitive to the
borrowing constraint than large firms. The coefficient of bank loans for small firms is
-0.112 whereas the coefficient of bank loans for large firms is -0.025. Small Firms keep
more trade credit (4 times greater) for self-financing as one-unit increase in bank loans
during the onset of financial crisis. This result is also robust with the primary findings of
this paper that smaller firms have to self-financing as the availability of the options is
scarce, and as a result offer less trade credit to their clients.
Table 2.9
Determinants of Trade Credit Diversion (NetTC) of Model 2—Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Net Income
Cash Lag
Liquidation
Bank Loans
Shares and Stocks
Industrial Growth Rate

Large

Large

Small

Small

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.087***

-0.083***

-0.007

-0.017

(0.020)

(0.021)

(0.059)

(0.059)

-0.088***

-0.089***

0.097**

0.099**

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.046)

(0.046)

0.011

0.010

-0.004

-0.003

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.033)

(0.033)

-0.025***

-0.028***

-0.112***

-0.107***

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.013)

-0.019***

-0.019***

(0.003)

(0.003)

7.662

8.257

1.099

0.910

(56.695)

(56.720)

(17.138)

(17.090)

Bank loans*Dummy
Constant

1.318

0.018

-0.062**

(0.024)

(0.032)

0.442
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-1.124

-0.943

(6.442 )

(6.547)

(2.183)

(2.179)

Observations

826

826

651

651

No. of I.d.

118

118

93

93

System Weighted R-Square

0.827

0.826

0.583

0.588

Dummy: score 1in the year of 2008--the onset of global financial crisis, otherwise, score 0.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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